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REINTERPRETING THE RULES ‘BY STEALTH’ IN TIMES OF CRISIS:  A 
DISCURSIVE INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION1 
 




This article examines the ways in which EU actors have engaged in incremental changes to 
the Eurozone rules ‘by stealth,’ that is, by reinterpreting the rules and recalibrating the 
numbers without admitting it in their public discourse.  Using the methodological framework 
of discursive institutionalism to focus on agents’ ideas and discursive interactions in 
institutional context, the article links EU actors’ rules reinterpretation to their efforts to 
ensure greater legitimacy in terms of policy performance and governance processes as well as 
citizen politics.   Using the normative theoretical framework of EU democratic systems 
theory, it analyses EU actors’ considerations of legitimacy not only in terms of their policies’ 
‘output’ performance and citizens’ political ‘input’ but also their governance processes’ 
‘throughput’ quality.  The article illustrates by elaborating on the different pathways to 





At the onset of the Eurozone Crisis in 2010, EU actors responded after some delay with loan 
bailouts and bailout mechanisms in exchange for which they all agreed to reinforce the pre-
existing rules and numerical targets of the Stability and Growth Pact through legislative pacts 
(the ‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Two-Pack’) and intergovernmental treaties and agreements (e.g., the 
European Stability Mechanism and the ‘Fiscal Compact’).   In the absence of any deeper 
political integration that could provide greater democratic representation and control over an 
ever expanding supranational governance, and in the face of major political divisions among 
EU actors over what to do and how, the EU ended up ‘governing by the rules and ruling by 
the numbers’ in the Eurozone (Schmidt 2015).  But as the crisis evolved from 2010 through 
2014, and as EU actors were tested by continued poor economic performance and growing 
political volatility, they slowly began to reinterpret the rules and recalibrate the numbers ‘by 
stealth,’ that is, without admitting it in their communicative discourse to the public.  Instead, 
they mainly continued to insist that they were sticking to the rules even as they incrementally 
altered them.   
 
Not acknowledging up front that the rules didn’t work meant that EU actors continued to 
operate under rules that were sub-optimal, and that constrained the range of possible 
solutions.  Moreover, it left their actions open at any time to being contested as illegitimate.  
By the same token, however, not saying what they were doing gave EU actors the space 
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necessary to reinterpret the rules incrementally—arguably until such a time as they could 
gain agreement to legitimate changing the rules more formally.   
 
The challenge for EU actors, in short, has been how to get beyond the original rules to more 
workable ones in a context in which formal rule-change has been difficult.  This has not just 
been a question of how to get around the institutional constraints that make formally 
changing the rules very difficult (Scharpf 1999, 2012) or the political logics of divided 
member-state perceptions of the crisis and diverging national economic interests 
(Schimmelfennig 2015).   It has also been a question of how to build legitimacy for change in 
a context of institutional-legal constraints and politico-economic divisions.  And for this, we 
also need to consider EU actors’ legitimating ideas and discourse about their actions within 
the EU institutional context.   
 
Explaining the legitimation of institutional change in terms of a disjunction between 
discourse and action demands a combination of methodological theory to explain institutional 
change and normative theory to define legitimacy.  In what follows, I argue that although the 
main neo-institutionalist analytic frameworks used in the explanation of the Eurozone 
crisis—rational choice and historical institutionalism—go a long way toward explaining the 
crisis response, discursive institutionalism provides a necessary complement.  By focusing in 
on agents’ cognitive and normative ideas about what to do and their discursive legitimation of 
what they did as they coordinated with one another and communicated to the public, 
discursive institutionalism helps explain the dynamics of change (and continuity) in the on-
going crisis over time.  Moreover, because discursive institutionalism sets any such action in 
institutional context, it is able to use the other neo-institutionalist approaches as background 
information even as it helps to explain the (re)defining of interests and the (re)shaping of 
institutions (Schmidt 2008, 2012).  Beyond this, by theorizing about legitimacy in terms of 
EU systems concepts of the responsiveness of the ‘input’ politics, the effectiveness of the 
‘output’ policies, and the quality of the ‘throughput’ processes (Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013), 
the article additionally offers an analysis of the constructivist logics of EU actors’ ideational 
and discursive legitimation of their reinterpretation of the rules ‘by stealth.’ 
 
To illustrate the discursive institutionalist dynamics of change, this article focuses on the 
cases of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Commission.  The different pathways to 
legitimation of the ECB and the Commission can be explained not only by differences in 
their (rationalist and historical) institutional context, in which the ECB had much greater 
autonomy than the Commission, which was subject to an increasingly divided and politicized 
Council, but also in meaning and discursive context.  The ECB benefited from a more open 
policy forum within which to develop new legitimating ideas through its coordinative 
discourse and to engage in a much more elaborate communicative discourse to the public 
than the Commission.  While the ECB was able to hide its reinterpretation of the rules ‘in 
plain view’, through a discourse that claimed that everything it did was in keeping with its 
Charter, the Commission had to hide behind a discourse that claimed that it was rigidly 
following the rules, even as it interpreted them ever more flexibly. 
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The article begins with a discussion of the differences between rational choice, historical, and 
discursive institutionalist theories of institutional change, and how they apply to the Eurozone 
crisis, followed by a sketch of the normative framework for the analysis of legitimacy, 
focused on EU systems theory.  It then explores the legitimating ideas and discursive 
interactions of the ECB, followed by the Commission. 
 
Theorizing Neo-Institutional Change (and Continuity) in the Crisis 
 
Explanations of the Eurozone crisis often tend to fit into one or another neo-institutionalist 
approach, including rational choice, historical, and discursive institutionalism.  Rational 
choice institutionalist approaches tend to focus on the interest-based political and economic 
logics of EU member-state actors in the crisis.  Historical institutionalist approaches 
concentrate on the path dependencies of or incremental changes to formal rules and 
institutional regularities during the crisis.  Discursive institutionalist approaches tend instead 
to look into EU agents’ crisis-based ideas and discursive interactions as they reshape their 
institutions and redefine their interests.   
 
In the Eurozone crisis, rational choice institutionalist approaches tend to cast member-state 
political leaders in the Council as the key actors in the crisis.  They generally concentrate on 
member-states’ rationalist political calculations in interstate bargaining and the domestic 
political interests and/or economic motivations that inform member-state positions.   
 
The more political accounts focus on interstate hard bargaining and brinkmanship, often 
within a ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ framework in which domestic politics determines 
member-state bargaining positions with minimal winning coalitions (Moravcsik 1998; see 
also Jones et al. 2015).  For example, the Eurozone crisis response of 2010 to 2012 has been 
described as a game of chicken in which the strong preference to avoid the break down of the 
euro area was combined with efforts to shift the costs to the weaker euro members most in 
trouble (Schimmelfennig 2015).  Similarly, the lopsided outcome of the Greek crisis of 2015, 
during which the government achieved none of its stated goals, was attributed to the Greek 
government’s nested games (Eurogroup and national constituency) and incomplete 
information (about Greece’s bargaining room), confronted with the brinkmanship of the 
Eurogroup finance ministers, led by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (Tsebelis 
2016).   
 
The more economic accounts additionally describe a structurally flawed euro that serves to 
benefit some member-states and handicap others.  This has created perverse incentive 
structures that helped to divide preferences while enabling Germany (with its Northern 
European coalitional allies) to impose its strategic preferences, aided by the decision rules 
(most notably the unanimity rule) that gave veto players extra clout while resulting in sub-
optimal outcomes, in particular for Southern Europe (e.g., Scharpf 2012; see also 
Schimmelfennig 2014).  Where EU supranational actors are considered at all, moreover, they 
are often cast as secondary players following member-states’ orders, motivated by self-
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interest, the push for bureaucratic power, or the cultivation of neo-functionalist spillover (see, 
e.g., Niemann and Ioannou 2015, pp. 209-212).   
 
Historical institutionalist approaches are often seen to provide a corrective to the rational 
choice perspective.  They embed events in a broader context traced over time and emphasize 
the endogeneity of institutions, because they set the rules and the boundaries within which 
individuals may choose their course of action, and point to the unanticipated consequences of 
decisions (Pierson 1996; Schimmelfennig 2015, pp. 19-20). In the Eurozone crisis, historical 
institutionalism emphasizes the design of the pre-existing institutions, and uses the concept of 
path dependency to explain how the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact were mainly 
reinforced through subsequent agreements such as the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal 
Compact (Gocaj and Meunier 2013; Verdun 2015).  That said, path dependence can be too 
general a tool, with a tendency to underplay the incremental changes through which old rules 
are reinterpreted, new policies layered onto the old, or old rules converted into new ones 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005).  In the Eurozone crisis, incrementalist historical institutionalism 
has been deployed to describe the layering of new elements onto existing rules or the creation 
of new institutions patterned on the old.  Scholars have noted a ‘redirection’ of existing 
instruments, as in the case of the ECB’s new supervisory responsibilities for banking union 
(Salines et al. 2012), the invention of new rules ‘copied’ from older institutions, as in the case 
of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and the ‘replacement’ of institutions, as 
with the substitution of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for the EFSF (Verdun 
2015, pp. 226-228).  
 
Historical and rational choice institutionalist approaches have also sometimes been combined 
to great effect to explain how successive (rationalist choice institutionalist) intergovernmental 
bargains have deepened European integration through processes of (historical institutionalist) 
incremental change.  For example, the phenomenon of ‘failing forward’ has been used to 
illustrate the neo-functionalist (historical institutionalist) dynamic in which liberal 
intergovernmental bargaining led time and again to incomplete agreements that produced 
piecemeal, failed reforms which soon required new intergovernmental bargains that 
generated further European integration without solving the overall problem of the Eurozone 
(Jones et al., 2015). 
 
From a discursive institutionalist perspective, historical institutionalist approaches do very 
well in describing how the rules and institutions continue or change incrementally over time 
but not so well in explaining why.  This is because they do little to elucidate how and why 
agents engage in layering, let alone inventing or reinterpreting the rules—other than to 
categorize them as change agents (as in Mahoney and Thelen 2009).  In contrast, although 
rational choice approaches do deal with agents, theirs are rational actors with fixed 
preferences in stable institutions.  From the discursive institutionalist point of view, although 
the resulting game-theoretic analyses may serve as useful depictions of strategic interests at 
any given point in time, they cannot deal with the complexity of real agents’ changing ideas 
about their interests in incrementally developing institutions, as member-state agents engage 
in a constant process of dialogue, deliberation, and contestation in their ‘coordinative’ 
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discourses of policy construction and ‘communicative’ discourses of political legitimation 
(Schmidt 2008, 2012).   
 
Without denying the usefulness of the parsimony of rational choice approaches that attribute 
interests to actors, in other words, discursive institutionalism seeks to elucidate agents’ own 
ideas about their interests across a much wider range than economic or political self-interest 
alone, while adding their value-based ideas.  Thus, instead of attributing socio-economic 
interests to ‘rational’ agents, discursive institutionalists elucidate real agents’ competing ideas 
about interests and values that may be embedded in policy ideas and programs that emerge 
from deep philosophies.  For example, scholars attuned to the importance of ideas point to the 
very different stories about the causes of the Eurozone crisis, with competing narratives about 
the problems resulting from government finances, household debt, lack of competitiveness, or 
a sudden stop in market financing (Jones 2015).  Alternatively, they show how EU actors’ 
ideas about austerity are embedded in policy programs that reflect deep philosophies (e.g., 
Blyth 2013), as in Germany’s ‘stability culture’, with its view of debt as shameful and its 
belief in an ordo-liberal economic philosophy focused on monetary stability and rule by laws 
(e.g., Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). And they demonstrate that ideas may be so 
powerful as to go against (rationalist) material self-interests, as in the ‘perverse logic’ of 
Germany’s ordo-liberal ideas and the problems these have caused for the Eurozone and 
Germany’s own economic interests (Matthijs 2015).  
 
Moreover, rather than seeing the European Council solely as an arena of hard-bargaining 
liberal intergovernmentalism, scholars focused on discursive interactions instead cast the 
Council as a forum of ‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’ in which the member-states seek 
to come to consensus-based agreements via processes of persuasion and deliberation (Puetter 
2014, Ch. 2; Bickerton et al. 2015).  We could add that only by considering the interactive 
processes of contestation along with deliberation can we explain how and why incremental 
changes in the rules were agreed in the Council, as Germany conceded, over and over again, 
to things it had initially resisted, including new institutional instruments of Euro governance 
such as Banking Union and new guidelines for Euro governance such as growth beginning in 
2012 and flexibility beginning in 2014 (Schmidt 2015).  It is also mainly through agents’ 
ideas and discursive interactions that we can explain how the ECB was able to persuade the 
more powerful members of the Council, and in particular Chancellor Merkel, to accept its 
many reinterpretations of its mandates, as well as to agree to Banking Union; or how the 
Commission was able to increase its discretionary powers while obscuring its increasingly 
flexible reinterpretations of the rules in the European Semester (Dehousse 2015; Bauer and 
Becker 2014).  To such approaches we could additionally point to ones that build on the 
‘multiple streams’ approach in policy analysis (Kingdon 1984), whether to emphasize the 
importance of policy entrepreneurs to change ideational paradigms during windows of 
opportunity, as in the ECB’s success in banking union (de Rynck 2016), or the importance of 
coherent coalitions of policy entrepreneurs, as in the Commission’s success in pushing for 
legally constraining norms for the European Semester from 2009 to 2013 (Saurugger and 
Terpan 2016). 
 
	   6	  
In sum, the addition of discursive institutionalism to our neo-institutionalist tool-kit helps 
lend insight into how EU institutional actors have incrementally managed to overcome the 
stasis-reinforcing aspects of their institutional contexts.  This is the case whether institutional 
context is understood in terms of the (rational institutionalist) logics of the EU’s sub-optimal 
incentive structures and member-states’ divided preferences (Scharpf 1999; Schimmelfennig 
2015) or the (historical institutionalist) constraints of the path dependencies stemming from 
change-resistant decision rules and the sunk costs of adaptation (Pierson 1996), even where 
incremental changes are instituted over time (Verdun 2015) and successive bargaining games 
deepen integration (Jones et al. 2015).  EU actors have overcome stasis by developing and 
implementing cognitive and normative ideas for rules-reinterpretation in coordination with 
other policy actors and in communication with the public.  Institutional context here therefore 
needs to be defined not only as the (historical) institutions and (incentive) structures within 
which agents find themselves but also as the ‘meaning’ context for their ideas as well as the 
discursive ‘forums’ in which actors articulate their ideas (Toulmin 1958; Schmidt 2012). As a 
result, different EU actors may follow different pathways not only because of their different 
institutional settings but also because of their different constructions of meaning and the 




Within this constructivist logic, it is important not only to consider agents’ (re)construction of 
their interests over time but also how they manage to normatively legitimate their actions to 
one another as well as to the wider public.  Most importantly, in particular in any crisis of 
politics and economics, real people don’t just think strategically, they also think about what is 
legitimate and how they will legitimate their actions to others.   
 
Although there are many different normative theoretical approaches to EU legitimacy (e.g., 
Beetham and Lord 1998; Bellamy and Weale 2015), this paper turns for definitions of 
legitimacy to the systems concepts often used in the EU studies literature.  These include the 
‘output’ effectiveness of EU policies, the EU’s ‘input’ responsiveness to citizens’ political 
concerns (Scharpf 1999, 2012; Mair 2013), and the ‘throughput’ quality of the EU’s 
policymaking processes (Schmidt 2013).  Throughput is judged by the efficacy of the 
decision-making processes, the accountability of those engaged in making the decisions (e.g. 
Harlow and Rawlings 2007), the transparency of the information (e.g. Héritier 2003), and the 
processes’ inclusiveness and openness to consultation and deliberation with the interest 
groups of ‘civil society’ (e.g. Coen and Richardson 2009; Kröger 2008). 
 
The first two such legitimizing mechanisms are often seen to involve a trade-off, in which 
more output performance through effective policy outcomes can make up for less input 
responsiveness, or vice-versa (Majone 1998; Scharpf 1999).  There is no such trade-off for 
the third mechanism.  Better quality throughput does not make up for either bad output or 
minimal input, whereas bad throughput—consisting of oppressive, incompetent, corrupt, or 
biased governance practices—can throw input and output into question by seeming to skew 
representative politics or taint policy solutions (Schmidt 2013). 
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Using these three mechanisms of legitimation to analyse EU actors’ initial ‘governing by 
rules and numbers’ and their subsequent ‘rules-reinterpretation by stealth’ suggests 
particularly interesting ways of stylizing our understanding of the Eurozone crisis.  Put 
succinctly, it could be said that initially EU actors assumed that reinforcing rules-based 
governance (throughput) would ensure good policy results (output) even in the absence of 
citizens’ political involvement (input).  But as EU actors themselves soon recognized, 
however good the quality of rules-enforcement (throughput), policy performance (output) did 
not improve as expected while political volatility (input) rose in response.  EU actors 
subsequently therefore began slowly to reinterpret the rules (throughput) in order to ensure 
better results (output) and to respond to the increasingly negative politics (input).  But doing 
so ‘by stealth’, the only possibility under the circumstances, still skirts problems of 
legitimacy, in particular with regard to lack of (throughput) accountability and transparency.  
 
In what follows, we look closely at the different pathways to ideational innovation and 
normative legitimation taken by the ECB and Commission.  There can be no doubt that 
formal institutional context matters greatly for the pathways taken by these supranational 
actors—meaning not only the rules governing their institutional autonomy and bureaucratic 
discretion but also their perceptions of their relative power and strategic interests vis-à-vis 
other EU actors.  But equally important are the ways in which supranational EU actors 
(re)conceived of their roles and responsibilities while seeking to build legitimacy for their 
changing ideas about what to do and how to do it.   
 
The ECB:  Legitimizing without Admitting Rules Reinterpretation  
 
As a non-majoritarian institution, the ECB has generally seen itself and been seen as 
legitimated by its output policy performance and, arguably, its throughput processes, with 
good output considered to act as a trade off for any deficiencies in political input. As ordo- 
and neo-liberal thought suggests, isolating the regulatory institutions carrying out the policies 
from majoritarian politics is as important for output performance as is instituting the right 
kinds of policies (e.g., Majone 1998).  All central banks in advanced industrialized countries 
have over the years become increasingly insulated from input politics for this reason, and the 
ECB is the example of this par excellence.  It has autonomy without any significant or at least 
sufficient democratic control from the classic ‘democratic circuit’ of parliamentary oversight 
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011, pp. 138-9).  But the ECB is therefore even more keenly aware 
of the need to succeed (and to be perceived as succeeding) in its (output) policy performance 
as well as to ensure the (throughput) quality of its governance processes.  This also means 
managing the perceptions of a wide range of actors not only directly, through citizens’ 
experience of monetary policy performance, but also indirectly, through the effectiveness of 
the ECB’s communicative discourse and/or its coordination with the groups engaged with the 
ECB in building, implementing, or assessing the Euro’s effectiveness (see Scharpf 1999, and 
discussion in Jones 2009).  With such discourse, the ECB sought to legitimate its own 
increasingly radical reinterpretations of the rules by carefully arguing that its actions 
remained within its remit as set out in its Charter.  
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From ‘Credibility’ to ‘Stability’ and ‘Never’ Lender of Last Resort to ‘Almost’ 
Initially, the ECB sought to manage perceptions with a communicative discourse focused on 
the quality of its throughput processes, by emphasizing the importance of maintaining its 
‘credibility’ through strict adherence to its (throughput) rules of inflation-fighting while 
resisting any (input) political pressures from member-state leaders.  This was the main mantra 
of ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet, whose discourse focused on ‘credibility’ as the 
financial crisis turned into a crisis of the real economy and then a sovereign debt crisis, and as 
his ‘non-standard’ bond-buying program remained extremely modest (in particular compared 
to the FED or the Bank of England), as he insisted that the ECB was not and could never be a 
lender of last resort (LOLR) (Trichet 2009).  
 
When first appointed head of the ECB, Trichet’s successor Mario Draghi initially continued 
with the discourse of ‘credibility’ while denying that the ECB could be a LOLR (Draghi 
2011).  But very soon thereafter (by Spring 2012), as the ECB engaged in more robust bond-
buying program, he switched his legitimizing discourse to a focus on ‘stability’ (see Figure 
1). In a randomized sampling of speeches and press conferences from Draghi’s appointment 
in late 2011 through 2013 (see figure 1), although ‘credibility’ appears in the first months of 
his mandate (winter 2011/spring 2012), it largely drops out of his vocabulary subsequently 
(with the exception of a small increase in Spring 2013).  In contrast, ‘stability’ remains the 
most prevalent term from 2011 and 2013, rivalled only by the word ‘competitiveness’—
linked to the economic growth prospects of the Eurozone—while ‘inflation’ stayed was a 
low-level yet steady presence, as was ‘structural reform’ at an even lower level. ‘Save the 
euro’ appears only once, since Merkel’s use of the phrase in 2010 to legitimate the Greek 
bailout to German citizens had panicked the markets. ECB Executive Board member Jörg 
Asmussen (2012) used that event explicitly in a speech to illustrate the problems of 
communicating to the people, with the markets listening (Schmidt 2014). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The shift from a discourse emphasizing credibility to one focused on stability was not 
uncontroversial.  The stability discourse was intended to help legitimate bond buying while 
overcoming the resistance of those who retained a narrow reading of the ‘no-bailout clause’. 
Already with Trichet, the modest ‘non-standard’ bond-buying policies led to internal fights 
within the ECB, and even the resignation of the two German members of the ECB governing 
board, Axel Weber in April 2011, Jürgen Stark in September 2011, in protest (Matthijus 
2015).  This led to the appointment of the more moderate Jörg Asmussen to the governing 
board, which facilitated further discretionary policies by the ECB.  But only once Draghi was 
appointed did the ECB move toward a more expansive view of its mandate.  Even so, 
stability was not accepted as on a par with credibility until the euro itself was clearly in 
danger.   
 
In using the word ‘stability’, the ECB sought to conjure up the ‘stability paradigm’ 
underlying EMU (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 93), and thereby to reassure all and sundry 
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that the ECB remained committed to its basic philosophy, as outlined in the Charter.  As ECB 
officials themselves explained, in a crisis the central bank ‘must stand ready to back up the 
market while increasing its communication to explain that its primary objective has not 
changed in crisis mode’ (Drudi et al., 2012, p. 890).  Thus, at the same time they insisted that 
the Charter was correct to prohibit primary market purchases of public sector debt by central 
banks, to prevent the ECB and Euro-system central banks from becoming an LOLR, they 
concluded that therefore ‘it must be clear that an increased intermediation role for and 
outright purchases of the central bank are only justified on grounds of malfunctioning of the 
financial markets—and hence the exceptional measures are temporary in nature—to ensure 
price stability in the medium term’ (Drudi et al., (2012, p. 894).  
 
The switch from credibility to a stability discourse also opened up space for the ECB to 
engage in informal interactions with EU leaders in the Council. Unlike Trichet, who seemed 
most concerned about maintaining his autonomy for purposes of ‘credibility’, Draghi sought 
to coordinate with Council leaders, including engaging in a concerted year-long ‘charm 
offensive’ to persuade Chancellor Merkel in particular that ‘unorthodox’ bond-buying 
programs and banking union were essential.  All the while, the bank was working to fashion 
policy packages acceptable (to Germany) and workable (for EMU) against Bundesbank 
opposition (Spiegel 2014).  Draghi succeeded in getting around Bundesbank opposition 
largely via Merkel and after bypassing the objections of the German representative on the 
ECB board.  
 
Importantly, however, while the ECB quickly switched its discourse from credibility to 
stability beginning in 2011, it continued to deny publicly that it would or could act as a lender 
of last resort (LOLR) despite slowly and incrementally layering on increasingly ‘unorthodox’ 
bond-buying policy that brought it closer and closer to one (Buiter and Rahbari 2012).  When 
Draghi was asked early in his term whether the bond buying was Europe’s version of 
‘quantitative easing’, his response was:  ‘Each jurisdiction has not only its own rules, but also 
its own vocabulary. [The bond-buying programs] are certainly unprecedented. But the 
reliance on the banking channel falls squarely in our mandate, which is geared towards price 
stability in the medium term … We call them non-standard measures (Financial Times Dec. 
19, 2011). Such measures did little to change the course of the crisis itself between 2010 and 
2012, however, since the discourse of denial kept the markets worried and primed for panic 
and attack, while the actual policies created their own knock-on effects for member-states, 
the banks, and the ECB itself (Blyth 2013).   
 
Only in July 2012, when Draghi pledged to do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the euro’, did 
the markets stop their massive attacks against Spanish and Italian sovereign debt, convinced 
that this constituted a pledge to act as an LOLR (although the ECB never stated this—and 
qualified the statement by adding that it would do whatever it takes ‘within our mandate’). 
The one significant difference from what central banks ordinarily do as LOLRs is that the 
ECB made its pledge conditional on the Italian and Spanish governments asking for it to 
purchase their debt and in exchange agreeing to a conditionality program focused on austerity 
and structural reform. Conditionality made the program more akin to an IMF-style lending 
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program, focused on dealing with insolvency, than an LOLR program, focused on illiquidity 
(Mody 2015).  Even German leaders largely accepted this shift in policy (Newman 2015), 
with the exception of the more orthodox Bundesbank, which supported the court case in the 
German Constitutional Court that opposed the ECB’s right to institute OMT.   
 
The ECB’s pledge in 2014 to engage in quantitative easing to stave off deflation, begun in 
early 2015, was yet another step toward becoming an LOLR without admitting it—and has 
also been questioned by German central bankers and economists.  In fact, with Asmussen’s 
replacement by a less moderate German representative to the Bundesbank, Sabine 
Lautenschläger, Draghi may have lost both support and room for manoeuver in his making 
the ECB more of an LOLR via quantitative easing. 
 
Legitimizing Rules Reinterpretation by Hiding it in Plain View 
So how do we explain the ECB’s remarkable reversals, in particular given the continual 
denials in the discourse?  The answers require considering the policy program and ideas on 
the one hand, the discursive interactions on the other.  In terms of ideas, very generally 
speaking, we could explain the ECB’s slow, incremental shifts in bond buying as involving a 
search for solutions.  The ECB’s pre-crisis ‘paradigm’ on what to do in the event of a crisis 
did not cover all the contingencies, and the ECB had to engage in a continual process of 
‘bricolage’ (see Carstensen 2011) in the context of emergency crisis management via 
increasingly ‘unorthodox’ policies that were unimagined and arguably unimaginable prior to 
the crisis.  These were the ad hoc responses of the ECB agents puzzling their way through a 
crisis rather than the result of ‘willful actors’ seizing the moment (Braun 2013).  Any 
reinterpretation of the rules was not easy because of very different ideas held initially by 
different members of the ECB board between more pragmatic central bankers willing to take 
an increasingly more expansive interpretation of the rules and more orthodox ones insisting 
on following the rules as heretofore strictly defined.   
 
In terms of discursive interactions, moreover, inside the ECB, member-state representatives 
to the ECB governing board were engaged behind closed doors in internal coordination 
processes of persuasion and contestation.  Initially, the more orthodox bankers mainly from 
Northern Europe formed a blocking coalition around Germany, but this changed as more and 
more Northern European countries rallied around the ECB President in a process of 
‘deliberative intergovernmental’ decision-making (Puetter 2014; Bickerton et al. 2015).  This 
left the Bundesbank (BB) increasingly on its own to espouse the most orthodox positions.   
 
In terms of our normative theory of legitimacy, we could explain the stand-off between the 
BB and the rest as a clash between the ECB and its increasing numbers of allies concerned 
about (output) policy results versus the BB’s sticking to the (throughput) principles of 
accountability and its view that technical agents ought not to take decisions that are the 
domain of input legitimate political actors.  This clash in views came out most clearly in the 
hearings of the German Constitutional Court.  The ECB’s executive board member Jörg 
Asmussen justified the unorthodox monetary policy measures as a (output) response to 
unusual circumstances, insisting that: “We are in a situation of one size fits none, that is why 
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we have extended these non-standard instruments.”  Bundesbank President Weidmann 
instead vehemently opposed ECB intervention on the grounds that its (throughput) remit was 
to control inflation, and that only the politicians had the (input) legitimacy to deal with the 
rest (Financial Times June 12, 2013). 
 
Ideational entrepreneurship is an added factor in the explanation of the ECB’s changing ideas 
and discourse over time. The switch in presidents of the ECB was of great significance, and 
needs to be added to the deliberative coordination of internal consensus among ECB bankers 
and the ECB’s changing communicative discourse to the public.  Trichet was the 
consummate civil servant whose career was focused on institution building in financial and 
monetary affairs, and whose ideas about what to do remained conservative. Draghi was much 
more innovative, having had a more diverse background, beginning as an academic 
economist with stints in international institutions and private as well as public finance, in 
which he was often called in to reform institutions and innovate policies (Basham and Roland 
2014).   Draghi was also a bridge-builder.  In the progressive reinterpretation of the rules to 
‘save the euro,’ not only did Draghi gain the trust and respect of fellow bankers, he also, as 
noted above, managed to develop sufficient rapport with Council leaders—and in particular 
Chancellor Merkel—so as to gain their trust and support as well.  As such, Draghi could be 
seen as a highly successful ‘policy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon 1984) who was able not only to 
develop a new set of actionable ideas acceptable to the broader central banking epistemic 
community, he was also able to legitimate this to the satisfaction of political as well as 
technical actors in potential veto positions.  The ECB itself, in fact, has been very successful 
as a policy entrepreneur overall.  In banking union, for example, a dominant group in the 
ECB in 2012 took advantage of Council decision-makers’ high uncertainty to help 
preferences converge around the idea of giving up national supervisory powers (de Rynck 
2015; see also Dehousse 2015). 
 
While the ECB appears to have managed incrementally to reinterpret the (throughput) rules 
so as to move slowly toward better (output) economic performance, the question of its input 
legitimacy remains.  Although the absence of even the shadow of input legitimacy can be 
seen to pose little problem when the ECB remains within its charter-based remit to guide 
monetary policy, as a trade-off with output legitimacy, it can be problematic where the ECB 
goes beyond that remit.  This is arguably the case when it pushed the more input-legitimate 
actors like the Council and individual member-states to implement policies focused on 
austerity and structural reform, as a quid pro quo for its bond buying programs (Braun 2013, 
pp. 6-8).  Worse yet was the ECB’s joining the ‘Troika’ in partnership with the IMF and the 
Commission to impose conditionality on program countries (Eichengreen 2013), not to 
mention ECB President Trichet sending secret letters to Prime Ministers threatening 
withdrawal of Central Bank support if they do not follow ECB demands.   
 
In addition to these questions of its input legitimacy, however, remain those related to output.  
Although the ECB remains the ‘hero’ of the crisis because it took action, one could 
nonetheless question its output performance.  Most prominent among these is the question:  
Did the ECB do enough soon enough?  It took five years after the inception of the euro crisis 
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for its (throughput) reinterpretation of the rules to bring it the place where it began the kind of 
quantitative easing that the US has engaged in since 2008—and only because deflation 
threatened. 
 
The Commission:  Neither Admitting nor Legitimating Rules Reinterpretation  
 
During the crisis between 2010 and late 2014, the Commission incrementally also altered its 
interpretation of the rules without acknowledging it.  But unlike the ECB, which has the 
autonomy to reinterpret its own rules, and chose constant communication to legitimate its 
reinterpretations by insisting that they remained true to the cardinal rules, the Commission 
had little independence of action, and therefore sought to hide its increasing flexibility with a 
harsh discourse focused on austerity and structural reforms.  
 
As befits a bureaucracy as opposed to an autonomous agency, the EU Commission depends 
for its legitimacy primarily on its carrying out of the (throughput) duties assigned it by the 
input legitimate bodies to which it must render accounts—the Council and increasingly over 
time the EP.  With the onset of the Eurozone crisis, however, the ‘master’ to whom the 
Commission saw itself accountable was narrowed to the Council as a result of the massive 
increase in intergovernmental decision-making in this area and the sidelining of the EP 
(Fabbrini 2013).  The Commission itself appeared to have lost much of its traditional power 
of initiative to the increasingly active European Council (Bickerton et al. 2015).  That said, 
Council legislation focused on reinforcing the Eurozone’s ‘governing by rules and 
numbers’—themselves mostly proposed by the Commission itself—further strengthened the 
Commission’s role as enforcer in the European Semester.  The Commission’s own legislative 
proposals in fact vastly increasing its powers of oversight as well as built in the discretionary 
authority that enabled it to reinterpret the rules—if only ‘by stealth’ (Dehousse 2015).  But 
with such new powers, the Commission’s legitimacy also became increasingly linked to the 
output performance of the policies it administered.  As for input legitimacy, its (throughput) 
processes of oversight over national governments’ budgets raised questions about whether 
this undermined the member-states’ own political input legitimacy.   
 
From Governing by Rules and Numbers to Greater Flexibility 
Initially, the Commission was most concerned with the quality of its administration of the 
rules (throughput), and conceived of its autonomy rather narrowly, with a constant eye to 
possible Council (read Germany and its coalitional allies) response.  As the crisis continued, 
however, in the absence of remedies to the crisis such as a fiscal union or Eurobonds and in 
light of a narrative focused on the sinners who overspent, the Commission was stuck with 
searching for solutions ‘like the drunk who looks for his lost keys under the lamp post’ 
because ‘that is where the light is’ (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014). Recognizing this reality, in 
particular as economic output performance deteriorated, the Commission made increasing 
numbers of exceptions and flexible adjustments for non-program countries, in particular 
beginning in 2013.  But it tried to avoid acknowledging this publicly not only because it 
lacked the independent authority of the ECB but also because it felt constant pressures from 
the member-states in the Council either to make exceptions or to deny them.  As a result, it 
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maintained a harsh discourse focused on the necessity of austerity and structural reform so as 
to circumvent the political pressures and objections from pro-austerity Council members.   
 
The Vice President of the Commission in charge of Economic and Monetary Affairs and the 
Euro, Olli Rehn, was the main public spokesperson for the Commission with regard to the 
European Semester between 2011 and 2014.  His communicative discourse was all about 
fiscal consolidation and structural reform in order to bring down excessive deficits and 
address macroeconomic imbalances.  Especially in the first few years, his speeches 
invariably referred to the need for consolidation along with structural reform.  In terms of 
word use frequency between fall 2011 and fall 2013, Rehn’s discourse was similar to that of 
ECB President Draghi, despite the differences in their responsibilities (see Figure 2).  This 
was most apparent in the absence of considerations of inflation, lender of last resort, or even 
‘save the euro’ in Rehn’s public pronouncements. Moreover, although Rehn, like Draghi, 
repeatedly referred to the importance of stability, Rehn’s discourse emphasized the ‘stability 
culture’ and/or the need for financial stability in the member-states, not price stability2. 
Additionally, Rehn’s focus on competitiveness was even more pronounced in his discourse 
than Draghi, especially by late 2012 into 2013.  Competitiveness served as a justification for 
the push for structural reforms, which also appeared steadily at an increasingly high level. 
Finally, interestingly enough, while Draghi largely dropped credibility as a reference point, 
Rehn continued to use it, but to different ends.  It focused on the member-states’ regaining 
credibility by consolidating their finances3, or Europe regaining ‘credibility on our road 
towards a stability union of both responsibility and solidarity’, not on the institution’s own 
credibility4. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Behind the discourse focused on stability, credibility, and competitiveness were practices that 
were becoming incrementally more flexible in the application of the rules and calculation of 
the numbers.  This is because the increasingly precise definition of rules and numerical 
targets, although limiting the Commission’s room for manoeuver, actually gave the 
Commission greater margins for flexibility.  The Six Pack regulations increased Commission 
discretion in evaluating a member-state’s fiscal position and adjustment effort, since the 
Commission was to take into account the ‘range of relevant factors’ when judging non-
compliance, including mitigating or aggravating ones, along with ‘exceptional circumstances 
(Mabbett and Schelkle 2014, pp. 12-13).  Moreover, RQMV made it harder for the Council to 
reverse a Commission decision.  All of this ensured the Commission a kind of built-in 
discretion without any built-in input accountability, in particular with regard to the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), where the Commission was essentially free to 
decide when to launch (or not) an MIP (Scharpf 2012).  This was in contrast to the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP), where merely hitting a certain number would trigger the procedure.   
 
But for both procedures, the actual calculations mattered, giving way to a ‘politics of 
numbers’ that raises questions about the ‘accounting’ end of flexibility (Mabbett and Schelkle 
2014, pp. 12-13) as well as the Commission’s accountability.  One such example was the 
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change to calculating the deficit in terms of a ‘primary’ surplus (deficit minus interest 
payments).  This enabled the Commission to allow countries that posted a primary surplus to 
delay rapid deficit reduction in order to propel growth, which is why France and Italy were 
given two-year delays to meet their deficit targets, first in 2013 and again in 2015.  In the 
case of Spain, moreover, the Commission ultimately also agreed to a delay deficit reduction 
by using a new calculation of the ‘structural deficit’ proposed by the Spanish government 
itself (on the grounds that Commission calculations underestimated the impact of 
unemployment).  But the Commission refused to generalize this calculation out of ‘concern in 
some capitals’ (read Germany) about the implications of using better estimates—which might 
ease up the pressures on program countries  (Wall Street Journal Sept. 24, 2013), thus raising 
questions about (throughput) fairness and consistency in the application of the rules.  
 
The Commission’s (throughput) flexibility came in for increasing criticism beginning in 
2012, in particular from Northern European member-states.  Germany remained very much 
wed to the ‘stability culture’ and ordo-liberal ideas (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013; 
Matthijs 2015), as did other Northern European countries like Finland and the Netherlands.  
Their increasing opposition to flexibility came to a head in 2014, with Germany and Finland 
making a frontal attack on the Commission in an eight page memo in which they claimed that 
the Commission used ‘a somewhat arbitrary approach’ in granting budget flexibility, and 
went so far as the suggest that ‘a separate pair of eyes’ was needed to ensure that the rules 
were properly applied (Financial Times 28 February, 2014).  In contrast, Southern European 
member-states continued to complain that the Commission was too rigorous, and that without 
greater leeway in the application of the rules they were concerned that their economies’ 
output performance would deteriorate along with their input legitimacy, as the voters turned 
increasingly to populist parties on the political extremes.  Moreover, by 2014, Italian Prime 
Minister Renzi, supported by French President Hollande, had been pushing the Council—and 
Merkel in particular—to agree to greater flexibility in view of the need for growth, which had 
already entered the Council discourse in 2012, pushed by the previous Italian Prime Minister, 
Mario Monti (Schmidt 2015).  Finally, lack of (throughput) inclusiveness in the internal 
Commission evaluation process was also an issue, in particular at first, since the Commission 
had initially shut out other Directorates-General which could have provided more nuanced 
information to moderate judgments about the numbers as well as to address the effects of any 
cuts (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014).  
  
But whatever the criticisms, the Commission consistently claimed to be applying the rules 
and running the numbers as its mandate demanded, despite the fact that it reinterpreted the 
rules increasingly flexibly over time. And by 2013, although the Commission tacitly 
acknowledged the failure of fiscal consolidation policies by agreeing to ease the policy on 
rapid deficit reduction, Commission spokespeople stuck to a discourse that claimed that it 
was prior success in austerity measures, not failure, which had allowed for a more flexible 
policy. Rehn claimed that things were getting slightly better only because the crisis response 
offered “a policy mix where building a stability culture and pursuing structural reforms 
supportive of growth and jobs go hand in hand” (Rehn 2013).  In response to the Northern 
Europeans in particular, moreover, the Commission insisted that the increasing complexity of 
	   15	  
the rules constituted a ‘methodological refinement’, and was ‘no change in policy, only a 
change in circumstances’ since ‘we now have more room for manoeuver’ because cutting 
deficits was no longer such an urgent priority (New York Times, May 17, 2013). 
 
Legitimizing Rules Reinterpretation by Hiding behind a Discourse of Denial 
Notably, while the Commission’s communicative discourse remained largely the same across 
time, and outside analysts saw the Commission as tone deaf to the economic and social 
impact of numbers-targeting rules, the actual internal coordinative bureaucratic discourse, as 
contained in the official reports, including the Annual Growth Surveys (AGSs) and the 
Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) incrementally more inclusive of such concerns.  
This resulted not only from Commission responsiveness to Council admonitions as output 
performance deteriorated but also to an internal opening by DG ECFIN to other Directorates-
General as well as to the member-states in the context of the sectoral advisory committees on 
employment and social policy.   
 
The initial experiences did indeed confirm critics’ worst fears regarding a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach in the European Semester that subordinated social cohesion goals to fiscal 
consolidation, budgetary austerity, and welfare retrenchment.  This was clear in the first AGS 
and CSRs in the 2011 exercise (Pochet 2010; see also Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014, pp. 12-
14).  The AGS’ first priority was ‘to set budgetary policies on a sound footing through 
rigorous fiscal consolidation’; the second priority was to engage in ‘rapid reduction in 
unemployment through labour market reforms’ focused on wage devaluation; and only the 
third proposed ‘growth enhancing measures,’ while there was no mention of social concerns 
such as the increase in poverty (Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 2011—COM 2011, 11 final, 
Jan 12, 2010, p. 9). 
 
Subsequent exercises of the European Semester were less narrowly targeted, however, at least 
on paper.  Moreover, even in the assessment of the results of the 2011 European Semester 
and guidance on 2011-2012 written in June 2011, the Commission was already highlighting 
problems with the (output) results, regarding ‘reaching the targets in the areas of 
employment, research and development, energy efficiency, tertiary education and poverty’. 
But the focus on austerity remained, as the Commission insisted that it was ‘essential to stick 
to agreed deadlines for the correction of excessive deficits and to consolidate swiftly’.  That 
said, the Commission did signal awareness of problems with the input legitimacy of the 
exercise, as it recommended involving national parliaments, subnational authorities, and 
other stakeholders ‘to build the legitimacy and effectiveness of the new EU economic 
governance’ (AGS 2011--COM(2011) 400 final, June 7).  Moreover, subsequent AGS’s 
recommended a more socially balanced set of priorities, including ‘tackling unemployment 
and the social consequences of the crisis’, including issues of poverty reduction and social 
inclusion as well as issues of education, training, and active labor market policies, pensions, 
and health policy.  This was the result of an increasingly more collaborative process over 
time from within the Commission (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014, pp. 21-28), but not from 
outside.  The absence of non-governmental stakeholders such as NGOs or the social partners 
at EU or national levels continued to raisequestions of (throughput) legitimacy with regard to 
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accessibility and inclusiveness.  Most importantly, however, although the stated objectives 
and recommendations did become more social and employment-friendly on paper, and more 
all-inclusive in process, their actual impact in practice remains in question. The fact that the 
first priority in the Annual Growth Surveys from 2011 through 2014 was fiscal consolidation 
helps explain why member-states cut first, and then naturally found there was nothing left for 
growth-friendly policy based on the Commission’s Agenda 2020, let alone for poverty 
alleviation and employment promotion (Alcidi et al., 2014).  
 
Only with the inception of a new Commission in January 2015 have the practices and the 
discourse seemed to be coming into greater alignment.  The Juncker Commission began 
presenting structural reform as a quid quo pro for greater flexibility through slower deficit 
reduction.  It also pledged to do more to alleviate the social costs of the crisis, as well as to 
promote growth through an investment fund.  And the Commission’s Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS) of 2015 for the first time put fiscal consolidation—now renamed ‘fiscal responsibility’ 
(defined as ‘growth-friendly fiscal consolidation’)—in third place, following investment for 
growth in first place, and structural reform in second place—now with a much wider set of 
recommendations, instead of the narrow focus on labour market flexibility of the AGS of 
2011 (AGS COM (2014) 902 final, Nov. 28).  As Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
declared in his first State of the Union speech to the EP on September 9, 2015:  “You cannot 
run a single currency on the basis of rules and statistics alone. It needs constant political 
assessment, as the basis of new economic, fiscal and social policy choices’.   The 
Commission’s first step in getting beyond the contradictions between its discourse and its 
actions was to publish a set of rules on flexibility in January 2015—only to get push back 




Increasingly over the course of the Eurozone crisis between 2010 and 2015, both the ECB 
and the Commission sought to improve policy performance (output) by reinterpreting the 
rules by which they governed (throughput) more and more extensively.  But they did this 
very differently.   
 
The ECB had significant autonomy to reinterpret the rules set out in its Charter so long as it 
could build a sense of agreement about what to do in its coordinative discourse of policy 
construction.  In addition, the ECB developed an elaborate communicative discourse to hide 
its reinterpretations of the rules ‘in plain view,’ by seeking to persuade its interlocutors and 
the general public that its policies remained within the mandate set out by its Charter, even as 
its reinterpreted that mandate more and more broadly.  As such, the ECB moved from a 
discourse of ‘credibility’ to one of ‘stability’ and from a discourse that pledged that it would 
‘never’ be a lender of last resort like normal central banks to almost becoming one, while 
passing this over in silence. 
 
The Commission had much less margin for manoeuver than the ECB since the rules it 
devised and administered were decided by the Council (with the EP in certain instances) and 
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pushed by the ECB.  The Commission’s lack of autonomy meant that although it also sought 
to build legitimacy with other EU actors for rules reinterpretation, the Commission had a 
rather thin communicative discourse through which it generally insisted that it was applying 
the rules with great vigour, via harsh austerity and structural reform, even as it actually 
applied the rules with increasing flexibility.  
 
The question today is whether the ECB and the new Commission from 2015 on will go from 
reinterpreting the rules ‘by stealth’ to a clearer discourse of legitimation.  If this happens, it is 
likely to be the result of a more input legitimate Commission President more willing to codify 
rules (re)interpretation, and an even more activist ECB successfully engaged in quantitative 
easing.  But how far this can go remains in question, given the Eurozone’s divided politics 
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Figure 1:  Word Use Frequency by ECB President Mario Draghi (Fall 2011 to Fall 2013) 
 
Source:  Speeches and Press Conferences, randomized choice, 3-4 per season.  
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Figure 2:  Word Use Frequency by Olli Rehn, EU Vice President in charge of Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and the Euro (Fall 2011 to Fall 2013).  
 
Source:  Speeches and Remarks, randomized choice, 3-4 per season.  
* Note that the blank spaces left for ‘Save the Euro’ and ‘Lender of Last Resort’ indicate that 
no mention was made of these terms. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Many of the ideas discussed herein were developed during a part-time Research Fellowship (June 2014-June 
2015) awarded by European Commission, Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) 
to consult and produce a paper on “Political Economy of EMU: Rebuilding Trust and Support for Economic 
Integration.”  For the report, see:  DG ECFIN Economic Discussion Papers 15 (Sept. 2015): 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eedp/dp015_en.htm  
2 See, e.g., Rehn’s speech at European American Press Club, Paris, 1 October, 2013; Debate in the European 
Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 June 2012; Speech at the European Economic and Social Committee public 
hearing/Brussels, 19 February 2013. 
3  See, e.g., Rehn’s speech on the adoption by the Italian Government of extraordinary fiscal and economic 
measures on 4 Dec., 2011; at the Conference on the European Semester/Warsaw 8 March 2013; and at the 
European American Press Club, Paris, 1 October, 2013; Press Conference in Strasbourg, 14 February 2012 
4  Speech at the EPC Policy Breakfast in Brussels 11 January 11, 2013 
